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v o I c e  o v e r  I p  ( v o I p )  a n d  I n t e r n e t 
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) technolo-
gies offer higher flexibility than traditional 
telephony infrastructures and the potential 
for lower cost through equipment consoli-
dation and new business models. In this 
article, I examine the current state of affairs 
on VoIP/IMS security through a survey of 
all the 221 known/disclosed security vulner-
abilities in the Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVE) database and in IETF RFCs/
drafts. My key finding is that the higher 
complexity of VoIP/IMS systems leads to 
a variety of attack vectors, many of them 
caused by unforeseen and unexpected com-
ponent interactions. A second finding is that 
what people seem to worry about in VoIP 
(traffic interception and impersonation) 
bears no resemblance to the distribution of 
vulnerabilities actually disclosed. The article 
concludes with some practical suggestions 
for securing VoIP systems. 
VoIP/IMS refers to a class of products that enable 
advanced communication services over data net-
works. While voice is a key aspect in such prod-
ucts, video and other capabilities (e.g., collaborative 
editing, whiteboard sharing, calendaring) are sup-
ported. The key advantages of VoIP are flexibility 
and low cost. The former derives from the (gener-
ally) open architectures and software-based imple-
mentation, while the latter is due to new business 
models, equipment and network-link consolidation, 
and ubiquitous high-speed broadband connectivity. 
As a result, VoIP has seen rapid uptake in both the 
enterprise and consumer markets. An increasing 
number of enterprises are replacing their internal 
phone switches with VoIP-based implementations, 
both to introduce new features and to eliminate 
redundant equipment. Consumers have embraced 
a slew of technologies with different features and 
costs, including P2P calling, Internet-to-phone 
network bridging, and wireless VoIP. These new 
technologies and business models are being pro-
moted by a new generation of startup companies 
that are challenging the traditional status quo in 
telephony and personal telecommunications. As a 
result, a number of PSTN providers have already 
completed or are in the process of transitioning 
from circuit-switched networks to VoIP-friendly 
packet-switched backbones. Finally, as the com-
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mercial and consumer sectors go, so do governments and militaries due to 
cost reduction concerns and the general dependence on commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) equipment for the majority of their IT needs. 
Higher complexity is often the price we pay for more flexibility. You can find 
more details about the complexity found in VoIP in the paper this article is 
based on [1]. In brief, several factors contribute to architectural, protocol, 
implementation, and operational complexity: 
The number and complexity of the various features integrated in a product ■■
are perhaps the single largest source of complexity. For example, voice and 
video transmission typically allow for a variety of codecs that may be used 
in almost-arbitrary combinations. 
Openness and modularity, generally considered desirable traits, allow ■■
for a number of independent implementations and products. Each of 
these comes with its own parameters and design choices. Interoperability 
concerns and customer feedback then lead to an ever-growing baseline of 
supported features for all products. A compounding factor to increasing 
complexity for many of the open VoIP protocols is the “design-by-com-
mittee” syndrome, which typically leads to larger, more inclusive specifica-
tions than would be the case in the closed, proprietary wireline telephony 
network from 20 years ago. 
Because VoIP systems are meant to operate in a variety of environments, ■■
business settings, and network conditions, they must be highly configu-
rable, increasing complexity. Of particular concern are unforeseen feature 
interactions and other emergent properties. These have often led to ex-
posed systems through misconfiguration (or poorly understood configura-
tion), as in the case of fraudsters who broke into Internet-accessible VoIP 
PBXs and routed long-distance calls through them at the expense of the 
PBX owners; this specific instance was estimated to have cost upwards of 
$5 million [5, 6]. Another case, enabled by the use of default passwords, 
was estimated to have cost $55 million [2]. 
Finally, VoIP is intended to work over a public data network such as the ■■
Internet, or an enterprise/operator network that uses the same underlying 
technology. As a result, there is a substantial amount of (strictly speak-
ing) non-VoIP infrastructure that is critical for the correct operation of the 
system, including DHCP, DNS, TFTP/BOOTP, NAT (and NAT traversal 
protocols such as STUN), NTP, SNMP, routing, the Web (HTTP, TLS/SSL, 
etc.), and many others. Even a “perfectly secure” VoIP system can be com-
promised by subverting elements of this infrastructure. 
Because of this complexity, manifesting both in terms of configuration 
options and size of the code base for VoIP implementations, VoIP systems 
represent a large attack surface. Over time, we should expect to encounter 
security problems arising from design flaws (e.g., exploitable protocol weak-
nesses), undesirable feature interactions (e.g., combinations of components 
that enable new attacks or facilitate known attacks), unforeseen dependen-
cies (e.g., compromised paths through seemingly unrelated protocols), weak 
configurations, and, not least, implementation flaws. 
In trying to understand the threat space against VoIP, my approach is to 
place known vulnerabilities within a structured framework. While a single 
taxonomy is not likely to be definitive, using several different viewpoints 
and mapping the vulnerability space along several axes may reveal trends 
and areas that merit further analysis. As a starting point, I use the taxonomy 
provided by the Voice over IP Security Alliance (VoIPSA), available at http://
www.voipsa.org/. VoIPSA is a vendor-neutral, not-for-profit organization 
composed of VoIP and security vendors, organizations, and individuals with 
an interest in securing VoIP protocols, products, and installations. The clas-
sification identifies six broad areas of concern: (1) social threats, (2) traffic 
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eavesdropping, interception, and modification threats, (3) denial of service 
(DoS), (4) service abuse, (5) physical access threats, and (6) interruption of 
services threats. Due to the nature of the vulnerabilities discussed, only the 
first four categories are relevant to our discussion. I also place the surveyed 
vulnerabilities within the traditional threat space of confidentiality, integrity, 
availability (CIA), and consider whether the vulnerabilities exploit bugs in 
the protocol, implementation, or system configuration. 
Many of the vulnerabilities center on the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), 
so it is worth highlighting some of its features and discussing its overall 
complexity. SIP is a protocol standardized by the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) and is designed to support the setup of bi-directional com-
munication sessions, including, but not limited to, VoIP calls. It is similar in 
some ways to HTTP in that it is text-based, has a request-response structure, 
and even uses a mechanism based on the HTTP Digest Authentication for 
user authentication. However, it is an inherently stateful protocol that sup-
ports interaction with multiple network components (e.g., middleboxes such 
as PSTN bridges). While its finite state machine is seemingly simple, in prac-
tice it has become quite large and complicated—an observation supported 
by the fact that the main SIP document is the second largest RFC ever (after 
the encyclopedic “Internet Security Glossary,” RFC 4949). Figure 1 shows 
the number of SIP-related RFCs (and the number of total bytes in these) per 
year (until May 2009), and a size comparison of the main SIP RFC with re-
spect to the TCP RFC, the five main MIME RFCs, the two Secure MIME (S/
MIME) RFCs, and the four main IPsec RFCs. These graphs should provide a 
quantitative, if indirect, indication of the complexity of SIP. 
F i g u r e  1 :  b r e a k d O w n  O F  s i P - r e L a T e d  r F C s  a n d  T h e i r  s i z e s
For a complete reference to the vulnerabilities surveyed, see an online table 
at [3]. 
Overview of VoIP Vulnerabilities
Threats against VoIP system availability by exploiting implementation 
weaknesses are fairly common. Some implementations were shown to be 
vulnerable to crashes or hanging when given empty, malformed, or large 
numbers of SIP INVITE (or other) messages. It is worth noting that the same 
vulnerability may be present across similar protocols on the same platform 
and product due to code sharing and internal software structure, or to 
systems that need to understand VoIP protocols but are not nominally part 
of a VoIP system. The reason for the disproportionately large number of DoS 
vulnerabilities is due to the ease with which such failure can be diagnosed, 
especially when the bug is discovered through automated testing tools (e.g., 
fuzzers). Many of these vulnerabilities may be more serious than a simple 
crash and could possibly lead to remote code injection. 
Unexpected interactions between different technologies used in VoIP 
systems can also lead to vulnerabilities. In some cases cross-site scripting 
(XSS) attacks were demonstrated against the administrator- and customer-
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JavaScript in certain SIP messages, often through SQL injection vulnerabili-
ties. The same vulnerability could also be used to commit toll fraud by tar-
geting the underlying database. XSS attacks that are not Web-oriented have 
also been demonstrated, with one of the oldest VoIP-related vulnerabilities 
permitting shell command execution. Another Web-oriented attack vector 
is Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF), whereby users visiting a malicious 
page can be induced to automatically (without user intervention, and often 
without any observable indications) perform some action on the Web servers 
(in this case, VoIP Web-based management interface) that their browser is 
already authenticated to. 
The complexity of the SIP finite state machine has sometimes led to poor 
implementations. One vulnerability allowed attackers to convince a phone 
receiving a call to silently complete the call, which allowed the adversary 
to eavesdrop on the device’s surroundings! The same vulnerability could 
be used to deny call reception at the target, since the device was already 
marked as busy. In other cases, it is unclear to developers what the use of 
a specific protocol field may be, in which case they may silently ignore it. 
Occasionally, such information is critical for the security of the protocol 
exchange, and omitting or not checking it allows adversaries to perform 
attacks such as man-in-the-middle or traffic interception, or to bypass au-
thentication checks. 
Since SIP devices are primarily software-driven, they are vulnerable to 
the same classes of vulnerabilities as other software. For example, buffer 
overflows are possible even against SIP “hardphones” and much more so for 
softphones, allowing adversaries to gain complete control of the device. Such 
vulnerabilities typically arise from a combination of poor (non-defensive) 
programming practices, insufficient testing, and the use of languages, such 
as C and C++, that support unsafe operations. Sometimes these vulner-
abilities appear in software that is not directly used in VoIP but must be 
VoIP-aware, e.g., firewalls or protocol analyzers. It is also worth noting that 
these are not the only types of vulnerabilities that can lead to remote code 
execution. Other input validation failures can allow attackers to download 
arbitrary files from a user’s machine or to place calls by supplying specially 
encoded URIs or other parameters. 
Undocumented on-by-default features are another source of vulnerabilities. 
These are often remnants from testing and debugging during development 
that were not disabled when a product shipped. As a result, they often offer 
privileged access to services and data on a device that would not be other-
wise available. One particularly interesting vulnerability allowed an attacker 
to place outgoing calls through the Web management interface. 
A significant class of vulnerabilities in VoIP devices revolves around default 
configurations, in particular default usernames and passwords. Lists of de-
fault accounts are easy to find on the Internet via search engine. Users often 
do not change these settings; ironically, this seems to be particularly so for 
administrative accounts, which are rarely (if ever) used in the home/SOHO 
environment. Other default settings involve NTP servers and DNS servers. 
Call interception vulnerabilities are a big concern with VoIP, given the 
plethora of tools for decoding video and audio streams and the ease of eaves-
dropping on network traffic, especially on the local subnet. Sometimes such 
vulnerabilities arise from strange protocol interactions and implementation 
decisions. For example, caching the location (address) of a VoIP phone based 
on the IP address used during boot time (using TFTP) seems a reasonable 
approach; however, since the boot and VoIP stacks are not necessarily tightly 
integrated, interaction with one protocol can have adverse effects (e.g., 
changing the perceived location of the phone) in the other protocol. Other 
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instances of such vulnerabilities involve improper/insufficient credential 
checking by the registrar or proxy or by the SNMP agent on the VoIP device, 
which can lead to traffic interception and user impersonation. 
The integration of several capabilities in VoIP products, e.g., a Web server 
used for the management interface, can lead to vulnerabilities being im-
ported to the VoIP environment that would not otherwise apply. In the 
specific example of an integrated Web server, directory traversal bugs or 
similar problems (such as lack of proper authentication in the Web interface) 
can allow adversaries to read arbitrary files or other information from the 
device. SIP components integrated with firewalls may also interact in unde-
sirable ways. Improper handling of registration requests may allow attackers 
to receive messages intended for other users. Other such examples include 
failure to authenticate server certificates in wireless environments, enabling 
man-in-the-middle and eavesdropping attacks. 
Some of the most serious non-implementation types of vulnerabilities are 
those where the specification permits exploitable behavior. For example, cer-
tain vendors permit the actual URI in a SIP INVITE call and the URI used in 
the Digest Authentication to differ; while arguably allowed by the spec, this 
enables toll fraud via credential reuse. 
While rare, protocol-level vulnerabilities also exist. These represent either 
outright bugs in the specification or unforeseen interaction between differ-
ent protocols or protocol components. For large, complicated protocols such 
as SIP and H.323, where components (code, messages, etc.) are semanti-
cally overloaded and reused, it is perhaps not surprising that such emergent 
properties exist. One good example is the relay attack in the SIP Digest 
Authentication [4], whereby an adversary can reuse another party’s creden-
tials to obtain unauthorized access to SIP or PSTN services (such as calling 
a premium or international phone line). This attack, depicted in Figure 2, is 
possible because authentication may be requested in response to an INVITE 
message at any time during a call, and the responder may issue an INVITE 
message during a call either automatically (because of timer expirations) or 
through a user action (e.g., placing the caller on hold to do a call transfer). 
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DISCUSSIOn
I examined 221 vulnerabilities, 219 of which were disclosed in CVE and two 
as Internet drafts or RFCs. Figure 3 shows the reported number of vulner-
abilities per year, up until approximately November 2009. The good news 
is that there appears to be a large drop in the number of reported vulner-
abilities in the past two years. The reasons for this drop (and whether it will 
revert or not) are not known, which is reason enough for caution. 
F i g u r e  3 :  V u L n e r a b i L i T i e s  P e r  y e a r
F i g u r e  4 :  b r e a k d O w n  b y  e F F e C T
Looking at the vulnerabilities surveyed, a few patterns emerge. An informal 
classification of vulnerability effects is shown in Figure 4. Most categories are 
self-explanatory; “attack the user” refers to vulnerabilities that permit attackers 
to affect the user/administrator of a device, without necessarily compromis-
ing the system or getting access to its data or services. XSS attacks and traffic 
eavesdropping attacks fall in this category, whereas attacks that compromise 
state (data) resident on the system fall in the “access to data” category. 
Half of the problems lead to a DoS in either an end-device (phone, soft-
phone) or a server (proxy, registrar, etc.). This is not surprising, since DoS is 
easily diagnosed. In many cases, the problem was discovered by automated 
testing, such as protocol or software fuzzing; software failures are relatively 
easy to determine in such settings. Some of these vulnerabilities could in 
fact turn out to be more serious, e.g., a memory corruption leading to a 
crash could be exploitable in a code injection attack. The second largest class 
of vulnerabilities allow an adversary to control the device, whether by code 
injection, default passwords and services, or authentication failures. Note 
that a few of the vulnerabilities (approximately 10%) were counted more 
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F i g u r e  5 :  V u L n e r a b i L i T y  b r e a k d O w n  u s i n g  T h e  V O i P s a   Ta x O n O m y
F i g u r e  6 :  V u L n e r a b i L i T y  b r e a k d O w n  b a s e d  O n  ( C O n F i d e n T i a L i T y, 
i n T e g r i T y,  a V a i L a b i L i T y )  C L a s s i F i C a T i O n
The same pattern with respect to the predominance of DoS vulnerabilities 
holds when looking at the breakdown according to the VoIPSA taxonomy, 
shown in Figure 5. It should not be surprising that, given the nature of the 
vulnerabilities disclosed in CVE, there is no data on physical access and (ac-
cidental) interruption of services vulnerabilities. Furthermore, while “Access 
to services” was a non-negligible component in the previous breakdown, it 
represents only 4% here. The reason for this apparent discrepancy is in the 
different definitions of service: the specific element in the VoIPSA taxonomy 
refers to VoIP-specific abuse, whereas my informal definition covers lower-
level system components which may not be usable in, for example, placing 
fraudulent calls. Another observation is that, while the VoIPSA taxonomy 
covers a broad spectrum of concerns for VoIP system designers and opera-
tors, its categories are perhaps too broad (and, in some cases, imprecise) to 
help characterize the types of bugs examined. 
The vulnerability breakdown according to the traditional (Confidentiality, 
Integrity, Availability) security concerns again reflects the predominance of 
DoS threats against VoIP systems, as seen in Figure 6. However, Integrity 
violations (e.g., system compromise) are a sizable component of the threat 
space, while Confidentiality violations constitute only 15% of disclosed 
vulnerabilities. This represents an inversion of the perceived threats by users 
and administrators who, anecdotal evidence suggests, typically worry about 
such issues as call interception and eavesdropping. 
Figure 7 shows the breakdown based on source of vulnerability. The over-
whelming majority of reported problems arise from implementation issues, 
which should not be surprising given the nature of bug disclosure. Problems 
arising from configuration represented 11% of the total space, including 
such items as privileged services left on and default username/passwords. 
However, note that the true picture (i.e., what actually happens with de-
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most likely undercounted: such problems are often site-specific and are not 
reported to bug-disclosure databases when discovered. On the other hand, 
implementation and protocol problems are prime candidates for disclosure. 
What is surprising is the presence of protocol vulnerabilities; one would 
expect that such problems would have been discovered and issued during 
protocol development, specification, and standardization. Their mere exis-
tence indicates high protocol complexity. 
F i g u r e  7 :  V u L n e r a b i L i T y  b r e a k d O w n  b a s e d  O n  s O u r C e  
( i m P L e m e n T a T i O n ,  C O n F i g u r a T i O n ,  P r O T O C O L )
F i g u r e  8 :  V u L n e r a b i L i T i e s  P e r  P L a T F O r m 
Finally, Figure 8 shows the breakdown of vulnerabilities based on the af-
fected type of platform. In a few cases, typically when a bug was found in 
a software library, the vulnerability could be exploited in both clients and 
servers. Otherwise, vulnerabilities are equally distributed between the two 
primary types of VoIP platform. Although not shown here, the same holds 
when looking at specific classes of vulnerabilities (e.g., DoS). 
Conclusions
The large majority of disclosed threats focused on DoS attacks based on 
implementation issues. While fault-tolerance techniques (such as replication) 
can be applied in the case of servers, it is less clear how to provide similar 
levels of protection at acceptable cost and usability to end-user devices. Un-
fortunately, the ease with which mass DoS attacks can be launched over the 
network against client devices means that they represent an attractive venue 
for attackers to achieve the same impact. 
Code injection attacks in their various forms remain a problem, despite con-
siderable progress in creating defenses. We need to do a better job at deploy-
ing and using these defenses where possible and in devising new techniques 
suitable for the constrained environments that some vulnerable VoIP devices 
represent. 
Weak default configurations also present a big problem, as they do across a 
large class of consumer and enterprise products and software. The situation 
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securely configuring a system with as many components as VoIP. Vendors 
must make an effort to provide secure-by-default configurations, and to 
educate users how best to protect their systems. Administrators are in need 
of tools to analyze their existing configurations for vulnerabilities. While 
some tools dynamically test network components (e.g., firewalls), we need 
tools that work higher in the protocol and application stack. Furthermore, 
we need ways of validating configurations across multiple components and 
protocols. 
Finally, there is simply no excuse for protocol-level vulnerabilities. While 
there exist techniques for analyzing and verifying security protocols, they 
do not seem to cope well with complexity. Aside from using such tools and 
continuing their development, protocol designers and standardization com-
mittees must consider the impact of their decisions on system implementers, 
i.e., whether a feature or aspect of the protocol is likely to be misunderstood 
and/or mis-implemented. Unfortunately, while simpler protocols are desir-
able, they seem incompatible with the trends we have observed in standard-
ization bodies. 
Network administrators can and must be proactive. Concrete steps to protect 
VoIP systems include but are not limited to: 
Stay current with firmware updates and security news about the devices ■■
deployed in your network. It is easy to overlook the fact that a VoIP hard-
phone may require a software update, just as servers and desktops do. 
Change the default/administrator authentication credentials in all devices ■■
and services! Make sure you cover all services running in each device (e.g., 
the Web-based management interface). 
Use any of a number of free or commercial SIP fuzzing tools, especially ■■
before initial roll-out of VoIP services, and after each firmware/software 
update. Do this both against end devices (hardphones and softphones) and 
servers. 
Make it your business to know what services each VoIP device is running. ■■
Do not trust the vendor to have produced a locked-down system—several 
misconfiguration-induced vulnerabilities came from leftover services run-
ning on the device. A simple port-scan will typically reveal such problems. 
If a service is not absolutely necessary, stop it; if that is not possible, block 
it at the firewall and complain to the vendor. 
Take steps to harden your VoIP servers. This may involve using obscure ■■
OS security features, or a different OS altogether. If possible, consider 
using a redundant server configuration with different operating systems 
running the same application server. (Using different application servers 
would be ideal, but impractical over the long run due to incompatibilities 
and configuration drift.) If you use server redundancy, make sure to test it 
periodically! There’s nothing worse than discovering your secondary server 
is misconfigured while your primary server is compromised. (In reality, 
there are many things worse than this. Nonetheless, it is a very unpleasant 
situation.) 
Harden/protect the infrastructure on which your VoIP services rely. Specific ■■
services that merit attention include DNS, DHCP, and TFTP. This involves 
many of the steps mentioned above, for each of these services. 
Limit arbitrary access to VoIP devices. While this seems at odds with the ■■
basic premise of VoIP, it is possible to channel communications through 
media gateways. While this risks introducing some scalability problems, 
it also offers the opportunity to monitor traffic for abnormal behavior and 
to block some types of attacks against end devices. Along the same lines, 
you may also want to consider putting all your VoIP traffic into a different 
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VLAN, especially if VLAN port configurations can be frozen (admittedly a 
difficult proposition in many environments). 
When possible, enable TLS authentication and encryption for SIP signaling ■■
and use SRTP for media encryption. While the use of SRTP in particular is 
not widespread, the benefits appear to outweigh the (performance-related) 
drawbacks. 
While there is no guarantee that the above steps will prevent a compromise 
(or that they are complete), they would have helped against most of the 
disclosed vulnerabilities we examined. The bottom line is that, while the 
situation with respect to VoIP security is currently bleak, there are steps you 
can take to protect your infrastructure today. 
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